These are quick comments discussing two pieces I read for a graduate seminar in ethnomusicology. I get upset by current musicology's general misappropriation/misinterpretation of Adornian aesthetics and critical theory. For example, the version of "On Popular Music" that we read for this class rendered the entire ending section of that essay absent, the very section that was a true defense of his position.
In a comparison of classic theories of consumption and culture, Timothy Taylor (2001) situates the Frankfurt and Birmingham Schools as “top-down” and “bottom-up,” respectively (p. 22). For him, these theoretical positions “represent two poles” (p. 23). Such a characterization is problematic, for just as the concept of polarity itself presupposes a pure opposition—the “north” and “south” could never meet, nor could the “positive” ever mix with the “negative”—the rhetorical use of this concept by Taylor presupposes that these two schools are theoretically static. It is, in fact, this very assumption that makes it necessary for him to attempt to maintain that both perspectives are simultaneously effective as analytical tools (p. 25). The flaw of Taylor’s argument is not in his realization that neither approach (i.e. that of the Frankfurt or Birmingham School) is wholly wrong, and hence that there is a need for his notion of a “double movement” between them; the flaw instead lies is in his claim that neither one is wholly right—“right” to the extent that neither group sufficiently maintains enough of both polarities (e.g. agency and structure) to maintain theoretical autonomy (p. 25). It is possible to argue that both schools of thought are more dynamic in their own right than Taylor will admit, but the Frankfurt School, in particular—with Adorno as its exemplar—contains enough of the sought for dialectic diversity. Contrary to what Taylor posits, this critical approach turns out to be as much “bottom-up” as it is “top-down.”
The first of the two critical areas I address herein revolves around Taylor’s focus on agency, or in the case of his description of the Frankfurt School, its lack thereof. The “top-down” approach, Taylor states, describes a situation where “the so-called culture industries promulgate their products on a public that accepts them unquestioningly” (2001, p. 22). The implicit assumption here is that because the public uncritically swallows whole the pill offered by the culture industry, it (and the individuals that constitute it) does not have any agency in making its decision, or constructing meaning. Taylor supports the prior statement through his description of the Birmingham School (i.e. the “bottom-up” approach and subsequently the polar opposite of the Frankfurt School). This view, he claims, recognizes “that people make their meanings out of mass-produced and mass-mediated cultural forms” (p. 22). This is in line with Taylor’s pre-occupation with the rhetoric of polarity (and the purity it implies), for it appears that his conception of “agency” seeks to avoid contamination—to remain separate from “structure.” It is then apparent why he overlooks the existence of agency and meaning in the Frankfurt School.
If making choices and creating meaning is the hallmark of real agency, as Taylor (2001) holds it to be, it would seem unlikely one would find any mention of it in a “top-down” approach. Adorno (2002) reveals that the opposite is true—public/individual agency and choice are, in fact, aspects of a successfully manipulative culture industry. Commenting on the consumer of popular music he states: “They ‘join in the ranks,’ but this joining does not only imply their conformity to standards; it also implies a decision to conform… the decision is an act of will (emphasis mine)” (p. 466). Assuming the role of consumer requires more than a mere dismissal of resistance, and whereas Adorno uses “will” instead of “agency,” it is undeniable that they are partners in reference to the same concept (2002, p. 466). Interestingly, Adorno is optimistic, for he claims that the listener’s “will is still alive and that under certain circumstances it may be strong enough to get rid of the superimposed influences which dog its every step” (p. 468). Where, then, is the structural determinism that Taylor claims comprises this “top-down” approach??? It is no doubt lost in the rhetoric of polarization.
At root, Taylor dislocates “agency” from its proper position. His intent is to keep it pure, to situate it outside of structure, or at least outside of its influence. But if “structure” were to allow an autonomous “agency” then it would cease to be “structure” as such. Adorno, and the Frankfurt School, on the other hand make it very clear that agency is an irrevocable aspect of their “top-down” approach. The “bottom-upness,” if you will, of agency, however is located (and contaminated in compared to Taylor’s pure “agency”) within structure. Because “top-down” contains the “bottom-up,” the Frankfurt School successfully invalidates Taylor’s rhetoric of polarization and provides a theory as diverse and dynamic at that which he claims to support.
The first of the two critical areas I address herein revolves around Taylor’s focus on agency, or in the case of his description of the Frankfurt School, its lack thereof. The “top-down” approach, Taylor states, describes a situation where “the so-called culture industries promulgate their products on a public that accepts them unquestioningly” (2001, p. 22). The implicit assumption here is that because the public uncritically swallows whole the pill offered by the culture industry, it (and the individuals that constitute it) does not have any agency in making its decision, or constructing meaning. Taylor supports the prior statement through his description of the Birmingham School (i.e. the “bottom-up” approach and subsequently the polar opposite of the Frankfurt School). This view, he claims, recognizes “that people make their meanings out of mass-produced and mass-mediated cultural forms” (p. 22). This is in line with Taylor’s pre-occupation with the rhetoric of polarity (and the purity it implies), for it appears that his conception of “agency” seeks to avoid contamination—to remain separate from “structure.” It is then apparent why he overlooks the existence of agency and meaning in the Frankfurt School.
If making choices and creating meaning is the hallmark of real agency, as Taylor (2001) holds it to be, it would seem unlikely one would find any mention of it in a “top-down” approach. Adorno (2002) reveals that the opposite is true—public/individual agency and choice are, in fact, aspects of a successfully manipulative culture industry. Commenting on the consumer of popular music he states: “They ‘join in the ranks,’ but this joining does not only imply their conformity to standards; it also implies a decision to conform… the decision is an act of will (emphasis mine)” (p. 466). Assuming the role of consumer requires more than a mere dismissal of resistance, and whereas Adorno uses “will” instead of “agency,” it is undeniable that they are partners in reference to the same concept (2002, p. 466). Interestingly, Adorno is optimistic, for he claims that the listener’s “will is still alive and that under certain circumstances it may be strong enough to get rid of the superimposed influences which dog its every step” (p. 468). Where, then, is the structural determinism that Taylor claims comprises this “top-down” approach??? It is no doubt lost in the rhetoric of polarization.
At root, Taylor dislocates “agency” from its proper position. His intent is to keep it pure, to situate it outside of structure, or at least outside of its influence. But if “structure” were to allow an autonomous “agency” then it would cease to be “structure” as such. Adorno, and the Frankfurt School, on the other hand make it very clear that agency is an irrevocable aspect of their “top-down” approach. The “bottom-upness,” if you will, of agency, however is located (and contaminated in compared to Taylor’s pure “agency”) within structure. Because “top-down” contains the “bottom-up,” the Frankfurt School successfully invalidates Taylor’s rhetoric of polarization and provides a theory as diverse and dynamic at that which he claims to support.
Adorno, T. W. (2002). On Popular Music (S. H. Gillespie, Trans.). In R. D. Leppert (Ed.), Essays on music (pp. 437-469). Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.: Univ. of California Press.
Taylor, T. D. (2001). Strange sounds : music, technology & culture. New York: Routledge.
